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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of political ideology on sustainable development. The value of doing this is two-fold. First, in the face of important social challenges, ranging from climate change to aging populations, the question of sustainable development has become a top priority for many observers and policy makers (Arrow et al., 2004) . Sustainability is closely related to investment in a society's capital stocks broadly conceived to include manufactured, human, and natural capital and referred to as genuine wealth. A country that is running down its genuine wealth is on an unsustainable development path and will experience falling welfare levels even if in the short-term its GDP per capita is raising. More precisely, intertemporal social welfare of a society is increasing if and only net investment in its genuine wealth is positive (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; Arrow et al., 2003) . Since these investments can, in principle, be measured (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; World Bank, 2006) , it is possible to study empirically the determinants of sustainable development and doing so is of first order importance (Dasgupta, 2010) . Second, sustainability is intrinsically linked to issues of governance. As noted, sustainable development requires investment in society's capital assets and decisions on these investments are the outcome of a political decision making process. Aspects of this nexus have been investigated previously. Aidt (2011) , for example, shows that corruption has a robust negative influence on sustainable development, while legal institutions that govern the way disputes are settled make little difference. Aidt and Veiga (2016) study the link between political institutions that define the general framework that governs decision making in a society and find a positive link between institutional quality and sustainable development. We add to this literature by studying whether short-term fluctuations in 3 the political ideology of the government (measured on a left-right scale) induce fluctuations in genuine investment.
Specifically, we use a panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013 to study the relationship between political ideology and growth in genuine investment. We find that right-wing governments are associated with improvements in genuine investment while genuine wealth tends to be run down under left-wing governments.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the theory underlying using genuine investment as an index of sustainable development and develops hypothesises linking investment in genuine wealth to the partisan cycle. Section 3 presents the data and the econometric approach. Section 4 presents the main results related to political ideology and genuine investment. Section 5
investigates the interplay between the years a party has been in power, political ideology and genuine investment. Section 6 offers a broader discussion of the results.
Theoretical background and hypothesises
The World Commission (1997) loosely defines sustainable development as a current economic path that does not compromise the well-being of future generations.
Following Arrow et al. (2004) , we adopt a more specific definition and say that a society is on a sustainable path if the present discounted value of the social welfare attained at each future date (its intertemporal social welfare) is not decreasing along that path. The advantage of this definition is that it puts the concept on a sound welfare theoretical foundation 1 and that it offers an operational bridge between theory and 1 In a recent survey, Fleurbaey (2009) highlights three main approaches to the measurement of social welfare: adjusted GDP, happiness indices, and the Human Development Index based on A. K. Sen's 4 empirical measurement. Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) proved that at society's intertemporal social welfare at time t is increasing if, and only if, the net investment in its genuine wealth is positive (see also Dasgupta, 2001; 2010) . Genuine wealth refers to the society's capital stocks broadly defined to include manufactured, human and natural capital and genuine investment is simply the additions to the various stocks valued at appropriately defined shadow prices. We return to the matter of how genuine investment can be measured empirically in the next section, but before we do that we discuss why partisan politics and elections, more generally, may induce cycles in genuine investment.
Whether a society at a given point in time moves along a sustainable development path or not is determined by the institutions that govern investment in genuine wealth. In democratic societies, these investment choices are made by elected politicians and the political parties they represent. The ideological position of the ruling government is likely to influence the scale, timing and composition of these investments. Elections provide citizens with a mechanism for selecting new governments and, as a consequence, parties with different ideologies gain and lose control of government at election time. Our hypothesis is that this induces partisan cycles in genuine savings and that a society over time may move on and off a sustainable economic path. The classical works by Hibbs (1977 Hibbs ( , 1987 and Alesina (1987) have shown how partisan cycles can emerge in macroeconomic aggregates because left-party governments are more inclined than right-party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. A more recent literature establishes how party ideology influences the size and scope of government with left-wing governments being capability approach. We focus on the first of these because it can, in contrast to the other measures, address issues related to sustainable development directly (Dasgupta, 2001, chapter 9; Dasgupta, 2010) . 5 more expansionary than right-wing governments (Pickering and Rockey, 2011; 2013) while right-wing governments are more willing to deregulate labour markets (Bjørnskov and Potrafke, 2012; 2013) and to promote deregulation of the energy, transport and communication industries (Potrafke, 2010 Reed (2006) , Imbeau et al. (2001), and Frederiksson et al. (2013) . 3 The theoretical foundation for the opportunistic political business cycle was laid by Nordhaus (1975) and integrated into rational expectations models by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) . The 6 investment. For example, the short-termism in macroeconomic management induced by such opportunistic behaviour may divert attention away from investment in the economy's capital stocks and towards current consumption and in that way create a dip in genuine investment around elections. However, whether the unintended consequences of opportunistic attempts to manipulate the macroeconomy are sufficiently strong to create a political business cycle in genuine investment must also
be considered an open empirical question.
Data and Econometric Specification
To investigate the interplay between ideology, elections and genuine investment, we use an unbalanced panel dataset of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013. To be included in the sample, a country must have regular elections over the relevant period.
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The countries in the sample are listed in the note to for dynamic panel data models -are suitable when the number of individuals (N) is small (and T is not large enough). Although T is not large in this study, the number of individuals cannot be considered small (N=82). Hence, this estimator may not be the most suitable choice for us and we estimate equation (1) with an instrumental variables estimator.
According to the large sample properties of the generalized method of moments (GMM), the dynamic estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is adequate when there is a clear dominance of cross sections over time periods in the sample. This is what happens in our panel. Taking first differences of equation (1), levels of the explanatory variables can be used as instruments to avoid correlation between lagged dependent variable and the country-specific effects. Arellano and Bond (1991) also proposed a variant of the GMM estimator, namely the two-step estimator, which utilizes the estimated residuals in order to construct a consistent variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. Although the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator and relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity, the efficiency gains are not that important even in the case of heteroscedastic errors.
This result is supported by Judson and Owen (1999) , who showed empirically that the 11 one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator, especially when the number of time periods is relatively high (T=30), which is the case in this study.
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A problem that we have to deal with is the "too many instruments problem".
Using too many instruments may result in over-fitting biases. When the number of time periods is relatively large, this over-fitting becomes even more serious. The consequent large collection of instruments, even if individually valid, can be collectively invalid because they over-fit endogenous variables (Doornik et al., 2002; Roodman, 2009a, b) .
They also weaken the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions used to check instrument validity. Hence, to minimize the over-fitting problem we use the collapse alternative suggested by Roodman (2009b) . The empirical results from this panel data analysis are presented and discussed in the next section. Table 2 reports the main empirical results. The specification reported in column
Main Results
(1) includes separate indicator variables for left-and right-wing parties. The effect of political ideology is, therefore, measured relative to centrist governments. We see that growth in genuine wealth is systematically higher under right-wing governments and 11 Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest another GMM estimator with additional moment conditions. If they are valid, they will increase the efficiency of the estimators. This is known as the system GMM estimator, which combines the moment conditions of the model in first differences with those of the model in levels. However, if the orthogonality conditions for the firstdifference equation are valid, but those for the level equation are not, then the system GMM may not be better than first-differences GMM. This can happen, for example, if the regressors used in the orthogonality conditions for the levels equation are correlated with the individual effects. Moreover, simulations suggest that the system GMM is not necessarily superior to the standard GMM in cases where the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the time-series observations are relatively large (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Moshirian and Wu, 2012) . This is what we observe in our data, so the estimator that seems to be more suitable for our empirical analysis is the one-step first-differences GMM estimator.
that there is no difference between left-wing and centrist governments. This suggests that we can be parsimonious and merge left-wing and centrist governments into one reference group and this is done in all subsequent specifications. From the specification reported in column (2), we observe that growth in genuine wealth is higher under rightwing governments than under either left-wing or centrist governments. In column (3), we report, for comparison, a specification estimated with a fixed effects estimator rather than with the difference-GMM estimator used in the other specifications. We observe that the point estimate on Right is smaller than the GMM estimate reported in column (2), but statistically significant at the one percent level. The estimate of the persistence parameter is much large, as one would expect in the presence of Nickell bias.
The positive effect of right-wing parties on GWgrowth is not just statistically significant, it is also of economic importance. The average growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is 0.62 with a standard deviation of 1.8 (see Table 1 ). Accordingly, based on the estimate from column (2), a switch from a left-wing or centrist to a rightwing government increases the growth rate of genuine wealth in the average country by 0.147 percentage points or by one twelfth of a standard deviation. The long-run effect is an increase of 0.29 (=0.147/(1-0.498)) percentage points. We interpret this as evidence that the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties, their greater willingness to deregulate markets, and their focus on provision of merit goods pay off in terms of investments in the fundamental capital stocks and that this is sufficient to compensate for any underinvestment in natural capital.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
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In contrast to the robust evidence on the partisan cycle, the timing of elections by itself does not appear to affect the growth rate of genuine wealth. The point estimate on Election year is never statistically different from zero, rejecting the idea of an opportunistic election cycle in genuine investment. 12 This is not entirely surprising.
After all, it takes time to enact policies with a substantive effect on genuine investment and, on top of that, it is hard for voters to observe and attribute short-term fluctuations in these investments to government policy. An implication, then, is that it is not elections per se that create cycles in genuine investment. Rather the cycles are created by underlying ideological differences with regard to economic policy that filter through to investments in genuine wealth over the tenure of a government with a particular political ideology. In Section 5, we dwell deeper into the role played by the length of time a government has been in office.
The partisan cycles in genuine investment are a short to medium run phenomena that can cause a country to move on or off a sustainable path over time. In contrast, the nature of the underlying political institutions can have a longer-term effect on the investments that a society makes in its fundamental capital stocks. More importantly, it is likely that the nature of the partisan cycle is, at least in part, a function of the underlying institutions. If so, we run the risk of conflating the two. To investigate this issue, column (4), in Table 2 , reports a specification that controls for Polity IV index.
This index is a comprehensive summary measure of the quality of the political institutions in a country at a given point in time. We observe that the point estimate on 12 In additional experiments, reported in Table A .1 in Annex, we investigate whether there is an election cycle in those elections which resulted in a change in the political orientation of the government, if there is an effect in pre-and post-election years, or if it matters how long the interval between elections is.
Apart from the weak positive effect of elections that result in a change of the political orientation of the government, we find no robust evidence of an election cycle.
Right is a little smaller than previously (0.126) but remains significant. 13 In contrast, the point estimate on Polity IV Index is far from statistically significant. Similar results are obtained for other broad measures of institutions. It, therefore, appears that the partisan cycle in genuine investment is separate from any effect that might come from variations in the broader institutional environment.
Yet, the many important differences in party systems that clearly exist make it, as previously noted, a challenge to measure differences in political ideology consistently across time and space. One way to engage with this is to investigate potential heterogeneity across subsamples of countries with broadly similar party systems. In Table 2 , columns (5) and (6), we report specifications that split the overall sample into an OECD and a non-OECD sample. We observe that there is a strong partisan cycle in both samples, but that the point estimate on Right is larger for the sample of non-OECD countries. 14 One the one hand, this suggests that the direction and qualitative nature of the association between political ideology and sustainable development is the same across societies at different levels of development and with different party systems. On the other hand, it also suggests that the amplitude of the cycle is larger outside the OECD democracies, possibly because the differences in the ideological stance of left-and right-wing governments with regard to economy policy are larger in non-OECD democracies. 14 While in the group of OECD countries the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is, on average, 0.13
percentage points higher when a right-wing party is in office, in the non-OECD countries it is 0.24 percentage points higher, ceteris paribus. 15 Besides the split between the OECD and non-OECD countries, we also investigated alternative sample splits. Those results, reported in Tables A.2 With regard to the set of economic control variables, we observe from 
Additional results: Tenure in office
In the same way as it takes time for the captain of a super tanker to change the ship's course, it takes time for a government to change the package of economic policies and for these policies to filter through to investments in genuine wealth. A long period in power is generally necessary to allow a government to fully implement its medium-term policies. The more time a government spends in office, the more scope it has to ensure consistency across different dimensions of its economic and social policies. Frequent changes in government, on the other hand, tend to see such efforts interrupted or reverted. It is, therefore, reasonable, on the one hand, to expect that the number of years that a government rules could have an independent effect on genuine investment and, on the other, that it may interact with the partisan cycle we identified above.
affects investment in genuine wealth in presidential, plurality and proportional representation regimes and are observed in both high or low income countries/democracies.
16 See Tables A.5 and A.9 in Annex.
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In all the specifications reported in reports the results. We observe that the relationship between the years that a right-wing 17 See, for example, the seminal paper by Mueller (1970) and Veiga and Veiga (2004) . 18 This effect may be reinforced by the fact that there tend to be more natural or forced cabinet changes towards the end of the life-span of a government. This, in turn, may reduce the efficacy of medium-term policies since the strategies for implementing those policies normally depend on the leader's vision.
17
party holds office and investment in genuine wealth follows an inverted U-shaped relationship. 19 The estimated maximum is reached after 15 years in office. The average number of years in office is 7.5 years with a standard deviation of 9.45. Accordingly, most of our sample is located on the upwards sloping part of the relationship, but there are some observations also on the downwards sloping part. This suggests that while the policies enacted by right-wing parties are "good news" for sustainable development in general, the positive effect wears off with years in office and may, in some extreme cases, become negative. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 report results for the OECD and non-OECD subsamples, respectively. The non-linear effect is present in both. 20 In Table   3 , columns (5) to (8), we investigate the effect of the years that the party leader (rather than the party itself) has been in power. Again, we find no direct effect (columns (5) and (6)), but the effect of right-wing parties on genuine investment does interact with the number of years that the party leader (Leader tenure) has been in power. The interaction is not, however, non-linear: only the interaction between Right and Leader tenure is statistically significant (column (8)).
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Conclusions
The question of sustainable development has become increasingly important for many observers and policymakers. Climate change, aging populations, debt crisis popping out in many countries and other important social and economic challenges have 19 The interaction Right*Party tenure is not statistically significant in specifications without the quadratic term. 20 The maximum for the OECD sample is reached at 13 years in office, while for non-OECD countries it is estimated to be 24 years.
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highlighted the importance of studying the subject. Sustainability is naturally linked to issues of governance in general and to policy decisions made by the governments in particular. These policy decisions depend on political ideology and electoral concerns.
In this paper, we add to the substantial existing literature on the influence of political ideology and electoral politics on public policy by studying the effect of ideology on investment in genuine wealth. We find strong evidence that the government's ideological colour matters and that investment in genuine wealth is higher when right-wing governments are in office. Economic conservatism attributed to rightwing parties and their greater willingness to deregulate the economy may be driving this effect. These results are robust and hold across all alternative specifications and subsamples tested. In contrast, our results clearly rule out the existence of opportunistic election cycles. The expansion/contraction cycle near elections (if it actually occurs)
does not seem to affect genuine investment.
Furthermore, the time a right wing government remains in office also appears to positively impact sustainable development, although it seems that this positive effect decays over time. Increasing costs of ruling and overall efficiency reduction faced by governments may help explain this result. Table 1 for definitions. The dependent variable is GWgrowth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A difference-GMM estimator is employed, except in regression (3) where a FE estimator is used instead; the lag of the dependent variable is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations (only one-step estimates are reported here, but the results remain unchanged with a two-step estimator -those are not reported here but they are available upon request); the respective lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Separate estimations for OECD and non-OECD countries are reported in columns (5) and (6), respectively. Three OECD countries are dropped in the estimations: Estonia (due to few observations and lack of variability), Iceland (very few observations for the dependent variable) and Switzerland (no variability in the ideology; always right-wing governments). Tables 1 and 2 . The dependent variable is GWgrowth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A difference-GMM estimator is employed, where the lag of the dependent variable is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. Separate estimations for OECD and non-OECD countries are reported in columns (3) and (4), respectively. Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Election Gov change is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when there are elections that result in the change of the political orientation of the government; 0 otherwise. Before Election is equal to one in the years before the elections; 0 otherwise. After Election is equal to one in the years after the elections; 0 otherwise. Election timing measures the passage of the time between election (it is equal to one in the election years).
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ANNEX
Table A2. Presidential versus non-Presidential regimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Presid (NPresid) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in countries with presidential (non-presidential) regimes; 0 otherwise. Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Plural (NPlural) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in countries with plurality (non-plurality) regimes; 0 otherwise. Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Majority is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the government has majority in the parliament; 0 otherwise. Coalition is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the government is formed by a coalition of parties; 0 otherwise. GDPpc growth is the real GDP per capita growth rate. GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate. %Pop0-14 accounts for the percentage of population between 0 and 14 years old. %Pop65above accounts for the percentage of population with 65 years or more. Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Institutional variables data comes from the International Country Risk Guide ( see https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-twomethodologies/icrg). Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. HIC (NHIC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for high-income countries (not high or low-income countries); 0 otherwise. Tables 1 to 3 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. "1990" indicates that the time period starts in 1990; "2000" indicates that the time period starts in 1990.
